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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the rationale behind IPO underpricing using a sample of REIT IPOs in 
Asia. Although the IPOs registered an average initial return of 3.08%, the issuers were able to 
sell the IPO shares above their fundamental values by timing the listings in periods when 
existing REIT stocks are traded at a premium to their net asset values (NAV). An IPO could 
therefore be underpriced and yet produce a net gain for the issuer from IPO. The issuers’ net 
gain from IPO is however negatively related to long-run performance of REIT IPOs.  
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Introduction 
In the financial market, issuers face the challenge of establishing the right offer price for 
an initial public offering (IPO). One puzzling aspect is that IPOs are often underpriced, that is, 
their first day closing market price is higher than the offer price, by as much as 10% to 24%.1 If 
the shares were sold at the first day closing price, the IPO proceeds would have been higher by 
an amount equal to the IPO underpricing, or the same proceeds could have been raised by selling 
fewer shares (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). This puzzle stems from the difficulty of measuring the 
fundamental value of a new firm. The first-day closing market price is usually assumed to be the 
intrinsic value of the shares, but this might not necessarily be true in an inefficient market 
characterized by investors’ heterogeneity and short sales constraints (Miller, 1977; Daniel 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Ritter and Welch, 2002).  
In this paper, we measure the fundamental value of a new firm using its net asset value 
(NAV), which represents the residual claims of shareholders in the event that the firm is 
liquidated after paying off all of its debts. The NAV valuation approach is more suited for firms 
owning tangible assets that have well-determined market prices, such as holding companies that 
invest in real estate assets.2 For this reason, we focus on the IPOs of real estate investment trusts 
(REITs), which are special investment entities set up for investing in and owning real estate 
assets. By regulation, at least 75% of a REIT’s assets must be invested in tangible real estate. A 
                                                          
1 See Rock (1986), Tinic (1988), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Loughran and Ritter (2002), Lowry and Shu (2002), Ritter and 
Welch (2002), Derrien (2005), Ljungqvist (2008), and Liu and Ritter (2011). 
2 IRS Revenue Ruling 59-60, Section 5(b) stipulates that, “the value of the stock of a closely held investment 
or real estate holding company, whether or not family owned, is closely related to the value of the assets 
underlying the stock. For companies of this type, the appraiser should determine the fair market values of the 
assets of the company… adjusted net worth should be accorded greater weight in valuing the stock of a closely 
held investment or real estate holding company, whether or not family owned, than any other customary 
yardsticks of appraisal, such as earnings and dividend paying capacity.” Source: National Association of 
Certified Valuators and Analysts (NACVA, 2012).  
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REIT must also distribute at least 90% of its net income as dividends to its shareholders, making 
its dividend flow and growth rate more predictable. This reduces the role of asymmetric 
information, one of the most popular explanations for IPO underpricing.3 Our study focuses on 
IPOs of equity REITs listed on four stock exchanges in Asia, namely, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Malaysia. The listing conditions in these markets specifically require issuers to 
report and substantiate a firm’s NAV with independent valuation reports by professional 
appraisers. All REIT IPOs in these four countries also involved “specified assets”; that is, all of 
the properties that are to be injected into the REIT are identified in the prospectus together with 
their independent valuation reports.4  
To our knowledge, our study is the first to formally analyze the relationship between 
REIT IPO pricing and NAV. In the first part of our empirical analysis, we examine the initial day 
returns, measured as the percentage change on the share price on their first trading day, of the 
sampled REIT IPOs to establish that underpricing is indeed evident with REIT IPOs. We then 
compare the offer price with the fundamental value of the shares, measured by NAV. If the offer 
price/NAV ratio of the shares is less than one, the issuers can be inferred to have experienced a 
net loss from the public listing. However, if the offer price/NAV ratio exceeds unity, the issuers 
have enjoyed a net gain from the IPO.  
                                                          
3 The asymmetric information explanation posits that one player in the IPO process is better informed than the 
others (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989) and that large first-day returns can be 
interpreted as compensation to uninformed investors for bearing such risks (Rock, 1986) or as remuneration to 
informed investors for providing private information about the true value of the stock during the pre-marketing 
or book-building exercise (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). However, Ritter and Welch (2002) conclude that 
these asymmetric information models have been overemphasized. 
4 In the United States, it is possible to list “blind pool” REITs; that is, the property assets need not be identified 
in the prospectus. A “blind pool” REIT IPO usually includes only an audited “balance sheet” of the new REIT. 
The capital raised will be invested after the offering at the discretion of the sponsor pursuant to a predefined 
investment strategy as outlined in the prospectus. For more information, see PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(December 2011) “Roadmap for a REIT IPO – A Summary Guide to Going Public.” 
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The results are summarized in Panel A of Figure I, which illustrates how an underpriced 
IPO could still produce a net gain for the issuers. The difference between the first-day closing 
price (C) and the NAV of the shares (A) times the total number of shares represents the total 
gains from IPO. It reflects the issuer’s ability to obtain a higher valuation on its real estate 
portfolio by opting for a public listing as opposed to selling the assets in the parallel private real 
estate market. REIT IPOs, similar to closed-end fund (CEF) IPOs traded on major stock 
exchanges, transform illiquid assets into liquid assets.5 On the basis that the discount rate for 
liquid assets should be lower than that for the underlying illiquid assets, Cherkes, Sagi and 
Stanton (2009) argue that a REIT could sell at a premium to NAV in equilibrium.6  
The net gains from the IPO are shared between the issuer and investors with the 
proportion based on the final offer price. The initial return of the average REIT IPO is 3.08%,7 
which is much lower than the initial returns recorded by operating company IPOs. This is not 
unexpected, because REITs are more transparent and easier to value than general firms.8 More 
interestingly, Panel A of Figure I also shows that the offer price of the shares (B) is on average 
3.54% higher than their NAV (A). This difference, which represents the net gain to the firm from 
IPO (versus staying private), provides a rationale for issuers and their underwriters to set the 
                                                          
5  We thank Jay Ritter for highlighting this. Clayton and MacKinnon (2000) also highlight that a major 
difference between CEFs and REITs is the relative degree of difference in the liquidity of fund units (or 
shares) and the assets that CEFs or REITs hold. Specifically, real estate assets owned by REITs tend to be less 
liquid than the securities held by CEFs.  
6 However, the present value of the management fees would offset part or all of the liquidity transformation 
strategy. Ooi (2009) observes that the average compensation of REIT managers in Singapore is approximately 
0.54% of the assets under management (AUM). 
7 The amount of money on the table is equal to the price increase on the first day of trading times the total 
number of shares issued. Note that the issuer also receives part of the money left on the table in proportion to 
the number of shares retained by the issuer.  
8 Other studies that examine the pricing of REIT IPOs also recorded first day returns that are generally much 
lower than those observed for common IPOs (Wang, Chan, and Gau, 1992; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997; Below, 
Zaman and McIntosh, 1995; Brounen and Eichholtz, 2002; Wong, Ong and Ooi; 2013). 
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offer price below the first-day closing price. The observation that a REIT IPO could be 
underpriced and yet produce a net gain for the issuer is a new contribution to the literature.  
In practice, most IPOs engage in a book-building exercise during which institutional and 
large investors are invited to register their interests based on a preliminary price range filed by 
the underwriters.9 In the context of a REIT going public, there are two potential reference points 
for the underwriters to anchor the IPO price range. As postulated earlier, the firm’s NAV is an 
important reference point to compute IPO gains (or losses), because the issuer could sell the 
physical assets in the alternative private real estate market at their full market value (Chan, Wang 
and Yang, 2009). Another reference point for IPO underwriters to consider would be the firm’s 
NAV adjusted by the prevailing peer-NAV premiums (we define this as NAV*), which 
incorporates additional information about the prevailing market premium/discount on NAVs 
around the time of filing the preliminary price range. To gain additional insights into how REIT 
IPOs are priced, we further analyze the preliminary price range, namely the floor price and the 
ceiling price, filed by the underwriters relative to the share’s NAV as well as NAV*.  
Panel B of Figure I shows that the difference between the NAV (A) and the floor price 
(D) of the filing range is small (-0.87%) and statistically insignificant, suggesting that the reserve 
price of the IPO shares is pegged close to their intrinsic value. The issuers’ reluctance to register 
a net loss from IPO by transferring their assets to the newly listed REITs at below their market 
value is logical because the properties could be sold directly, either individually or as a portfolio, 
to other investors, including existing publicly traded REITs (Chan, Wang and Yang, 2009). The 
ceiling price (E) of the filing range, on the other hand, is set well above (6.56%) the firm NAV. 
It is, however, only slightly above NAV* (F) (1.23%, not statistically significant). The final offer 
                                                          
9 Benviniste and Spindt (1989) provide a good discussion on the premarketing activities involved in an IPO.   
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price is also close to NAV* (-0.96%, statistically insignificant). These observations combined 
suggest that underwriters are firstly careful to avoid any missed opportunity due to filing a too 
low ceiling price and, secondly, information contained in the NAV premiums of existing 
publicly traded REITs is incorporated into the IPO preliminary distribution price and offer price.  
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we examine how IPO pricing is affected by 
market condition and large investors’ reception during the roadshow. The underwriters, by 
timing the listings to coincide with favorable conditions in the stock market, seek to price the 
IPO stocks above their intrinsic value to generate a net gain for the issuers. The underwriters also 
gather useful information during the roadshow which could be used to determine the final offer 
price and allocation of the IPO. As shown in Figure II, we find that REITs tend to go public 
during periods during which the stock prices of their peers are at a premium to NAV because the 
bullish valuation in the capital market, which is when underlying assets are more highly valued 
in the capital market than in the private market, allows issuers to price the new shares above their 
NAVs. This market-timing behavior is consistent with the ‘windows of opportunity’ hypothesis 
whereby firms take advantage of transitory windows by issuing equity offerings when their 
stocks are substantially higher than the fundamental value of their underlying assets (Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995: Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders, 2005; Boundary, Kallberg and Liu, 2010).  
In the third part of our empirical study, we examine the possible effects of pricing the 
IPO stocks above their fundamental value on their initial day return and long-run performance 
(over 100-day, one-year, and three-year holding periods). Due to the market-timing behavior of 
issuers, we expect that the initial day return is correlated with the issuer’s net gain and that the 
stock price will revert to its fundamental level over a longer period. We test these propositions 
by examining whether the initial day return and long-run performance (over 100-day, one-year, 
6 
and three-year holding periods) of REIT IPOs are related to issuers pricing the IPO stocks above 
their fundamental value, and timing the IPO during hot issuing markets. As predicted, we find 
that issuers’ net gain is positively related to the initial day returns and negatively to firm 
performance over longer horizons.  
In summary, the findings suggest that the average REIT IPO is able to create wealth for 
both the investors and the issuer in the short run, but it underperforms over longer horizons as the 
bullish stock price readjusts back to its fundamental level. Conversely, we find that the offer 
price premium over NAV* is not significantly related to the initial day returns, suggesting that 
underwriters have incorporated information contained in the prevailing market premium when 
setting the offer prices. The long-run performance of the REIT IPOs are, however, positively 
related to the offer price premium over NAV*, which is not surprising, as REITs that hold high-
quality properties and or have better growth prospects are expected to have superior long-run 
performance over their peers.  
 Our paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides the relevant institutional background 
on REITs. Section II describes the data employed. Section III contains the empirical results. 
Section IV provides our conclusions.   
  
Why REITs 
REITs are special investment entities set up to invest in and own real estate assets 
collectively. To qualify as a REIT, a firm must meet several requirements. First, at least 75% of 
its total assets must be in real estate. Second, a significant portion of its gross income must come 
from real estate-related sources, such as rents. Third, it must pay out a significant portion (at 
least 90%) of its taxable income as dividends. As an investment vehicle, a REIT enjoys tax 
7 
transparency status, meaning that it is not subject to corporate income tax. Thus, there is no tax 
advantage for a REIT to have debt in its capital structure (see Ooi, Ong and Li, 2010).  
Essentially, two approaches exist to determine the true value of stocks. The most 
common method for valuing firms going public is to use comparable firm multiples.10 However, 
Ritter and Welch (2002) warn that the accounting data of newly listed firms might not be reliable 
because they are usually valued on the basis of their growth options.11 In contrast, the NAV 
valuation approach involves determining the fair market value of the assets owned by a firm. 
This approach may not be easily employed to value firms that carry their assets on the balance 
sheet at historical cost (less accumulated depreciation). To revise the NAV of these firms, a stock 
analyst adjusts the book value of the assets to their fair market value, typically by applying broad 
assumptions and desktop calculations. Furthermore, the estimation of a firm’s asset value is 
complicated by the presence of intangible assets, such as trademarks, patents, goodwill, or 
alliances. Nonetheless, the relatively straightforward nature of property assets has led many stock 
analysts to value REITs by their underlying asset holdings (Gentry, Jones and Mayer, 2003; 
Capozza and Seguin, 2003). Gentry, Jones and Mayer (2004) propose that REITs’ price/NAV 
ratios are more reliable than those of operating firms, because they are backed by property 
appraisals, which involve a physical inspection of each assessed property by independent 
appraisers who are specialists in their field.  
                                                          
10 Studies that have employed comparable firm multiples to estimate the fundamental value of IPO firms 
include Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), Pukthuanthong-Le and Varaiya (2007), Jagannathan and Gao 
(2004), and Campbell et al. (2008).  
11 The dividend capitalization model can be further simplified if a constant growth rate g is assumed over an 
infinite time horizon and if the discount rate k is greater than the growth rate g. This result is the familiar 
Gordon dividend discount model, where P0 = D / (k–g), where D is dividend per share. Ritter and Welch 
(2002) highlight that the prior rapid growth of many young companies makes it easy to justify high valuations 
by investors who want to believe that they have identified the next Microsoft. 
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Another advantage of using data from a single industry, and on REITs in particular, is the 
reduction of potentially confounding effects attributable to differences in risk, transparency, and 
growth potential (Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu, 2005). REITs are more homogenous, because they 
hold real assets and face similar growth constraints. Therefore, they can be viewed as good peers 
for valuation purposes (Chan, Chen and Wang, 2013). Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2008) find that 
REIT IPOs exhibit lower prediction errors (19%) relative to IPOs of general firms (40%). This 
leads them to conclude that REITs are relatively easy to value, even using simple comparables, 
because they exhibit less cross-sectional variations in pricing.12  
Given the dual markets for real estate assets, REITs also provide a good laboratory for 
tracking how real estate stocks could deviate from their fundamental values in the private real 
estate market. Analyzing a sample of U.S. REITs that traded during the period of 1990 to 2003, 
Gentry, Jones and Mayer (2004) note that, although the median price/NAV ratio was 1.01, it 
varies significantly over time. Specifically, the median value increased to higher than 1.20 for all 
of 1997 and decreased to lower than 0.90 for most of 2000.13  Clayton and MacKinnon (2000) 
further attribute the variations over time to changing investment sentiment in the REIT market.14 
Linking the price/NAV ratio to REIT capital structure decisions, Boudry, Kallberg and Liu 
                                                          
12 Hartzell, Karlberg and Liu (2008) compare a rough estimate of prediction errors for REIT IPO pricing to that 
documented by Kim and Ritter (1999) for general corporations. Using the median Q for all seasoned REITs to 
predict a REIT IPO’s Q, their mean absolute prediction error is less than half as large as that in Kim and Ritter.  
13  Several studies have also investigated the equilibrium relationship between the NAV and market 
capitalizations of non U.S. REITs. Barkham and Ward (1999) find that U.K. property stocks trade, in general, 
at a discount to their NAV. Patel, Pereira and Zavodov (2009) report a tendency for the NAV discount of U.K. 
REITs to revert to the long-term mean value of 20%. While Liow (2003) also finds some evidence of mean 
reversion behavior of Singapore property stocks towards their NAV, he notes that the speed of reversion is 
slow and deviations between the two markets’ valuation could therefore be prolonged.  
14 Recent studies in behavioral finance present evidence that investor sentiment has a significant impact on 
stock prices. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) attribute the divergence of the stock price from the NAV of 
closed-end funds to investor sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2006) attribute stock mispricing to an uninformed 
demand shock in the presence of a binding arbitrage constraint.  
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(2010) find that REITs are more likely to issue equity when their price/NAV is trading higher 
than one, which generally coincides with the capital market valuing the cash flows of the 
underlying property portfolio more highly than the private market. During these periods, the cost 
of equity in the public market is relatively cheaper than that in the private market. Ling, Ooi and 
Xu (2016) examine the impact of asset growth rates on the future stock performance of 308 
publicly traded REITs in the United States and find evidence that the growth effect is 
significantly less negative for REITs selling at a premium to NAV.15  
 
Data 
Our study sample covers all REIT IPOs listed between 2001 and 2013 on four stock 
exchanges in Asia, namely Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. All REITs in these 
countries are equity REITs (that is, there are no mortgage REITs or hybrid REITs). It should be 
noted that Asian REITs are relatively new. The first two REITs in Japan were listed in 
September 2001, followed by Singapore’s maiden REIT listing in 2002. In 2005, REIT markets 
took off in Hong Kong and Malaysia. Table AI in the appendix provides a comparison of the 
REIT structures in these four markets. The guidelines in these markets are generally similar, but 
to account for possible differences across markets, we compute IPO volume, peer pricing and 
market performance using information for the respective markets.  
Table I shows the fluctuating number of REIT IPO issues during the 13-year study period 
that spans different market cycles: 2001–2004 coincided with a slow market, whereas 2005–
                                                          
15 Ling, Ooi and Xu (2016) highlight the existence of a parallel private market that allows a listed REIT to 
potentially arbitrate its observed cost of capital advantage or disadvantage. More specifically, a REIT can 
permanently increase its NAV and create shareholder value by funding asset growth when NAV premiums are 
positive and by buying back stock or paying off debt with the proceeds from the sale of properties when its 
stock is selling at a discount to NAV.  
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2007 marked the hottest IPO wave, with a total of 60 offerings. The number of IPOs dried up in 
2008–2009 primarily because of the global financial crisis, which saw many IPO sponsors 
postponing their listing plans.16 The number of IPOs started to increase again in 2012.  
Our initial sample covers 112 equity REIT IPOs. Two IPOs had to be omitted from the 
study sample because of missing data. Another three IPOs (CapitaLand Commercial Trust, 
Ascott Residence Trust, and K-REIT Asia) involved spin-offs—events during which shares of 
new firms are distributed (either freely or at a heavily discounted price) to existing shareholders 
of issuing firms—and were also omitted.17 The final sample of 107 IPOs covered 94% of the 
total listed REITs in Asia based on their market value. Data on the IPOs, financial attributes, and 
REIT performances during the study period were extracted from Bloomberg. Information on the 
stock ownership of sponsors and institutional investors was hand collected from the listing 
prospectus. Information on the NAV per share, which is defined as the REIT’s total assets minus 
total liabilities scaled by total shares outstanding after the IPO, are extracted from the IPO 
prospectus for Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore REITs and from the financial statements of 
Japanese REITs. In contrast, U.S. REITs are not required to report the appraised value of their 
properties; therefore, their NAVs are not directly observed.18 
                                                          
16 The following eight REIT IPOs were pulled: Sunlight REIT (May 2006), Regal REIT (September 2006), 
AIG J-REIT (November 2007), Dynasty REIT (October 2012), SPH REIT (May 2013), Lotte Shopping REIT 
(February 2014), Manulife U.S. REIT (June 2015), and APL Japan Trust (October 2017). The main reason for 
pulling these IPOs is the deterioration in the capital market that would adversely affect the IPO offer price and 
take-up rate. In most instances, the market NAV premium declined during the pre-marketing period.  
17 Note that all REITs in these four countries are equity REITs. Mortgage REITs and hybrid REITs do not 
exist. Additionally, all of the IPOs of these REITs involved specified assets. Thus, we did not exclude any 
REIT IPOs except for those with missing data and those that were spin-offs. 
18 Reliable NAVs are not widely available for seasoned U.S. REITs because their real estate assets are not 
always marked to market value (Barkham and Ward, 1999; Clayton and MacKinnon, 2000). 
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All of the sampled REIT IPOs engage in a book-building exercise during which 
institutional investors are invited to register their interest.19 The underwriter first estimates an 
offer price range for the shares, and then conducts a “roadshow” to gauge the market’s reception 
to the issue. The road show is designed by the issuer to both inform and educate investors and to 
solicit information about the market’s reception to the issue. For example, investors might 
express mild or strong interest at different prices within the underwriter’s proposed range. The 
nonbinding indication of interest is used to set the final offer price, which may fall anywhere 
within the lower and upper bound of the price range depending on the information extracted 
from investors during the roadshow (Benviniste and Spindt, 1989). The overallotment option is 
normally exercised when pre-market demand for the shares exceeds expectations.20  
For 93 of the IPOs, we were able to obtain the preliminary price range filed by the 
underwriters for the roadshow. All IPOs were eventually priced within the price range. The 
ceiling price of the IPO filing range reflects the issuer’s optimism, and the floor price reflects the 
issuer’s reserve price, or the minimum price for the IPO to proceed. In practice, the final offer 
price is dictated by the market’s reception during the roadshow. If the IPO is well received, the 
final offer price is likely to be fixed at the upper range of the filing price. However, if the 
response is lukewarm, the final offer price is likely to fall toward the lower range of the filing 
price. In our analysis, the popularity of an IPO stock is gauged by the percentage difference 
                                                          
19 Since its introduction, the book-building IPO procedure has dominated IPO auctions in both the United 
States and globally, despite strong economic incentives in favor of auctions. Degeorge, Derrien, and Womack 
(2007) hypothesize that corporate issuers and investment banks are in a quid pro quo relationship; that is, 
issuers are willing to pay the higher direct and indirect costs of book-building in exchange for increased and 
more favorable research coverage.  
20 In general, an overallotment option allows underwriters to issue as many as 15% more shares than originally 
planned. This option is also known as the “green shoe,” after the name of the Green Shoe Manufacturing 
Company, which was the first to use the clause in its underwriting agreement.  
12 
between the final offer price and the midpoint of the filling range. Of our sampled REIT IPOs, 
69.9% were eventually priced at or higher than the midpoint price range, with 64.5% achieving 
the maximum filing price. Of the remaining, 30.1% were eventually priced lower than the 
midpoint price range, with 18.3% fixed at the bottom of the price range.  
 
 
Results 
Distribution of IPO Pricing 
We first examine the initial day returns (1st day close/offer price - 1) of the sampled IPOs 
to determine whether IPO underpricing exists with REIT IPOs. The traditional asymmetric 
information-based explanation for IPO underpricing views underpricing as a result of uncertainty 
regarding the true market value of the new entity (Rock, 1986). Ritter and Welch (2002) argue 
that IPO underpricing disappears entirely when information asymmetry approaches zero.21 To 
understand issuers’ rationale behind the IPO underpricing, we examine whether the IPOs are 
priced lower than the fundamental value of the shares by comparing the offer price with its 
NAV. The offer price premium to NAV (Offer price/NAV - 1) indicates if issuing firms enjoyed 
net gains from IPOs. We further analyze the preliminary price range, namely the floor price and 
the ceiling price relative to the firm NAV. In addition, we compare the first-day closing price 
with the ceiling price to examine if there is a missed opportunity by setting a too-low ceiling 
price.  
Table II reports the distribution statistics for the IPO pricing of REITs listed between 
2001 and 2013. We observe a statistically significant positive first-day return averaging 3.08%, 
                                                          
21 Empirical support for this prediction is provided by an early study by Peavy III (1990), who observes that 
the mean initial days’ return of 41 closed-end fund (CEF) IPOs in the 1980s was not significantly different 
from zero. 
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which is comparable to the 3.60% registered by 85 U.S. REIT IPOs from 1991 to 1994 (Ling and 
Ryngaert, 1997). However, the first-day returns are much lower than those observed for general 
stock IPOs in Asian countries: 44.7% in Japan, 15.8% in Hong Kong, 25.8% in Singapore, and 
56.2% in Malaysia (Loughran et al., 2017).22 The smaller degree of IPO underpricing for REIT 
IPOs indicates that there is greater certainty over the fundamental values of REITs, which is not 
surprising, because REITs operate under more stringent rules to protect retail investors. 
Moreover, REITs own tangible real estate assets, which are not firm specific.   
More interestingly, Table II shows that the offer price of the stock is, on average, 3.54% 
higher than its NAV. The median value of 3.63% is also statistically significant. Panel B further 
shows that the offer price is equal to or higher than NAV with 75.7% of REIT IPOs in our 
sample. Figure I, which illustrates the relationship among the first-day closing price, the offer 
price, and NAV, suggests that issuers can rationalize setting the offer price below the first-day 
closing price (IPO underpricing), since the offer price is still greater than the expected net sale 
price if the assets were sold in the private market. Note that, in our sample, issuing fees for the 
average REIT IPO amount to 2.47% of NAV or 3.17% of the proceeds. Even after subtracting 
fees, the premium ((Offer price-fees)/NAV - 1) is positive (0.27%). Considering that selling 
assets in private market would require the total cost of approximately 5% in Asian countries, 
issuers were generally able to achieve net gains by going public even after fees are considered. 23  
                                                          
22 Loughran et al. (2017) is available on Jay Ritter’s website (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). Initial 
returns of U.S. REIT IPOs are also much lower than those of general IPOs, which averaged 17.9% during 
1980-2016.  
23  The total cost of transferring properties in the direct market is approximately 5%, which covers the 
brokerage fees, legal costs, and stamp duties. Between 2005 and 2015, a tax concession was given to 
Singapore REITs that made them exempt from the normal 3% stamp duty on acquisitions of local properties. 
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We next analyze the preliminary price range, namely the floor price and the ceiling price, 
relative to the firm NAV. The minimum price that is acceptable to an issuer can be extracted 
from the floor price of the filing range. Because the underlying property assets could be sold in 
the parallel private market, issuers have little economic incentive to proceed with an IPO unless 
they can obtain better pricing in the securitized market. In support, Table II shows that the 
reserve price of the shares, the floor price, is pegged close (-0.87%) to their intrinsic value 
(NAV). The ceiling price, on the other hand, is set well above (6.56%) the firm NAV and very 
close to the first-day closing price. On average, the ceiling price is only slightly below (0.73%) 
the first-day closing price, and the difference is not statistically significant. This implies that the 
ceiling price is generally set high enough to prevent any missed opportunity for issuing firms. 
To understand if the information about the market premium at the time of issue is 
incorporated into the IPO pricing, we compare the first-day closing price with the price level that 
would have been expected based on prevailing peer-NAV premiums at the time of issue. 
Specifically, we calculate NAV*, defined as the NAV of IPO REIT multiplied by (one plus peer-
NAV premium) where peer-NAV premium is the median NAV premium among peers (all 
REITs within the same country) at the time of IPO. Table II shows that the average first-day 
closing price is not significantly higher than NAV* (1.59%), indicating that underwriters do take 
into consideration the market premium of existing publicly traded REITs when setting the price 
range of the IPO.  
 
Effects of Market Condition and Market Reception on IPO Pricing 
To examine the effect of market conditions on IPO pricing, we separate the IPOs into 
offerings made in hot, normal, and cold issue markets defined using the IPO volume in the 
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general stock market (not just REITs) in each country. Following Lowry (2003), we classify 
periods at the top quartile of IPO volume in the respective markets as hot IPO markets and those 
at the bottom quartile as cold IPO markets. To examine the effect of market reception on IPO 
pricing, we also separate the IPOs on the basis of the market’s reception to the individual 
offering. In addition to the prevailing market condition, a particular IPO might also be popular 
during the pre-market exercise because of factors such as confidence in management, a good 
corporate governance structure, and/or attractive pricing of the shares. Whenever the final offer 
price is higher (lower) than the midpoint of the book-building price range, the IPO is classified 
as a popular (unpopular) stock. Hanley (1993); Ritter (1998); and Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri 
(2002) employ a similar approach to measure the popularity of individual IPOs. 
Table III summarizes the IPO pricing range across different market conditions. First, it 
shows that the initial day return (1st day close/offer price-1) is positive for the sample of IPOs 
issued in hot (4.68%) and normal (3.18%) markets and with popular IPOs (6.89%), but is 
negative for IPOs issued in cold markets (-1.33%) and with unpopular IPOs (-4.09%). Second, 
the offer price is higher than the NAV in all market conditions even in cold markets (1.76%), 
while the offer price is lower than the NAV with unpopular IPOs (-2.16%). The results generally 
support that issuers set the offer price above their asset values regardless of the market condition, 
while the level of net gains of issuing firms is affected by the market condition. With unpopular 
IPOs, issuers suffer net losses if they choose to proceed with the IPO offerings.  
 The floor price is set close to firm NAV except in cold markets (-3.08%) and with 
unpopular IPOs (-3.57%). The first-day closing price is not too far from the NAV* in hot 
(2.39%) and normal (1.12%) markets and with popular IPOs (-0.50%), but it is much higher than 
the NAV* in cold markets (5.17%) and with unpopular IPOs (3.38%). This result implies that, 
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when the market condition is not supportive for IPOs and for the unpopular IPOs, the prevailing 
market premium might not contain useful information for IPO pricing, probably because these 
REITs are going public for unique reasons. It is also notable that the first-day closing price is, 
not surprisingly, much lower than the ceiling price in cold markets (-4.13%) and with unpopular 
IPOs (-10.42%).  
Table III previously indicates that, in normal and hot markets, issuers priced the IPO 
stocks much higher than their fundamental values by timing the listings to avoid unfavorable 
conditions in the IPO market. To examine this trend further, Figure II tracks the NAV premium 
and the volume of REIT IPOs during the study period. 
Chart A tracks the NAV premium and the volume of Asian REIT IPOs at the aggregate 
level, while Chart B tracks the NAV premium and the volume of all IPOs (including general 
stocks and REIT stocks) in each of the four markets. The two charts show that the trend of 
general stock IPOs generally mimics REIT IPOs in the Asian countries during the study period, 
with high IPO volumes during 2005-2007 and after 2012 and low IPO volumes during 2008-
2009. Therefore, to define market conditions, we use IPO volumes of general stock markets to 
better capture the capital market conditions because the Asian REIT markets were nascent and 
thin during our study period.  
The data also show a close linkage between IPO volume and stock market condition, 
indicative of issuers’ practice of timing their IPO offerings when the underlying assets are more 
highly valued in the capital market than in the private market. The bullish valuation in the capital 
market helped issuers to price shares higher than the NAV and to achieve a final offer price that 
is at the top of the filing range. This market-timing behavior is consistent with the “windows of 
opportunity” hypothesis, whereby firms take advantage of transitory windows by issuing equity 
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offerings when their stocks are substantially higher than the fundamental value of their 
underlying assets (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Buttimer, Hyland and Sanders, 2005; Boundry, 
Kallberg and Liu, 2010).24  
 To understand the determinants the initial-day return and the long-run returns of 
individual IPOs, we run a set of regressions. The initial-day return is represented by the 
difference between the first-day closing price and the offer price of the shares, normalized by the 
offer price, while the long-run returns are represented by their buy-and-hold returns (BAHRs) for 
100-day, one-year, and three-year periods after the first trading day. This value is measured as 
the raw BAHR of the IPO stock minus the contemporaneous BAHR of the respective general 
stock market index. As previously noted, the initial-day return averaged 3.08%. BAHRs are -
1.31%, -0.35%, and 2.22% for 100-day, one-year, and three-year periods, respectively.  
Table IV presents the definitions and summary statistics of the dependent and 
explanatory variables in the regression models. The key explanatory variable in our regression 
models is the offer price premium over the NAV (OFFER_NAV). A positive relationship 
between OFFER_NAV and the initial-day return implies that, even with the IPO underpricing, 
issuers still gain from favorable valuations of the properties transferred to the newly listed REIT. 
However, we expect that the coefficients of OFFER_NAV in the long-run performance 
regression models to be negative, as a bullish stock price readjusts back to its fundamental level.  
To examine the pricing of new IPO firms relative to their peers, we also include the offer 
price premium over the peer-adjusted NAV (OFFER_NAV*). A significant effect of 
                                                          
24 As discussed earlier, Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010) find that REITs are more likely to issue seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs) when their price/NAV is trading higher than 1 because, in this scenario, the cost of 
equity in the public market is cheaper than that in the private market. Buttimer, Hyland, and Sanders (2005) 
similarly observe that REIT IPOs in the United States usually coincide with periods when REIT share prices 
were at a premium to their NAVs. 
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OFFER_NAV* on the initial return would imply that the prevailing market premium contains 
relevant information that was not fully incorporated in the offer price. Also, as a proxy for 
quality and or growth prospect, we expect OFFER_NAV* to have a direct relationship with the 
long-run performance of the individual IPOs. We also examine the effects of market condition 
and market reception on the initial return and the long-run performance. We include variables for 
both hot and cold issuing markets and include the variable for the market reception (popularity of 
an IPO) at the stock level. To identify popular IPOs, we compute the percentage difference 
between the final offer price and the midpoint of the filing range of each IPO. Whenever the final 
offer price is higher than the midpoint of the book-building price range, the IPO is classified as a 
popular stock.  
We also include a set of control variables in the regression models, namely the sponsor’s 
ownership (S_OWNERSHIP) and reputation (S_REPUTATION), the underwriter’s reputation 
(U_REPUTATION), institutional holdings (INSTITUTIONAL), and issue size (IPO_SIZE). To 
control for scaling effects, natural logarithms are employed for S_OWNERSHIP and IPO_SIZE. 
We also control for fixed effects related to property type and the market economy as well as a 
binary variable for maiden issue (FIRST) if the IPO is the first of a particular property type in the 
market economy. Kallberg, Liu and Srinivasan (2004) find that the quality of a real estate limited 
partnership decreases with each successive partnership issued by a given sponsor. To control for 
market learning in the initial return regressions, we created a numerical variable that captures the 
sequence of the IPOs done by each sponsor; e.g., this variable takes the value of 1 for the very 
first IPO done by a sponsor, 2 for the second IPO done by the same sponsor, and so on 
(MARKET LEARNING). We control for liquidity (LIQUIDITY) in the initial return regressions 
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using the bid-ask spread (the difference between the asking price and the bidding price scaled by 
the mid-price on the IPO date).25 
Table IV shows that the offer price premium over NAV averages 3.54%. The IPO offer 
price was, on average, 1.01% higher than the midpoint of the book-building price range. The 
sponsors retained approximately 22.66% of the shares, which is comparable to post-IPO holdings 
of 23% to 26% for venture capital sponsors (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; 
Gompers and Lerner, 1999). On average, institutional investors hold 43.32% of Asian REITs’ 
stocks, which is close to the 44% observed by Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2008) for U.S. REIT 
IPOs. The average size of REIT IPOs is $412.3 million, ranging from a minimum of $21.8 
million to a maximum of $2.84 billion. In comparison, the average size of REIT IPOs in the 
United States ranges from $176 million (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997) to $202 million (Gokkaya et 
al., 2015). Of the offerings, 15.9% (7.5%) were issued during hot (cold) issue markets, 
respectively. The total number of IPOs performed by each sponsor ranges from 1 to 6, with a 
mean value of 1.3. The liquidity value of 0.5% represents the average bid-ask spread scaled by 
mid-price on IPO date. The magnitude of the variance inflation factor (VIF) ranges from 1.12 to 
2.81, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious issue in the regression models.  
 
 
Determinants of Initial-Day Return 
Table V reports the estimation results for the initial day return. Model 1 is estimated 
using OLS. Because the amount of money left on the table is a function of two decisions, 
namely, the degree of underpricing and the number of shares sold (Loughran and Ritter, 2002), 
the percentage of shares retained by the issuer (S_OWNERSHIP) might be endogenous in Model 
                                                          
25 Clayton and MacKinnon (2002) show that liquidity is a component of the NAV premium. 
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1. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the IPO underpricing and proportion of shares retained 
by the sponsors using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV regression that uses FIRM_SIZE 
(natural log of the market capitalization of individual REITs) as the instrument variable. The 
estimation involves regressing S_OWNERSHIP against all covariates and the instrument variable 
and then using the predicted value of S_OWNERSHIP to estimate the underpricing equation. The 
regression results are reported in Table V under Model 2.26 In each of the regressions, we also 
control for property- and country-fixed effects.  
As predicted, the coefficient for OFFER_NAV is positive and statistically significant in 
both models. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that an underpriced IPO can still 
generate a net gain for the issuing firm. Therefore, the average IPO creates wealth for both 
investors and issuers, and when the larger net gain is targeted by the issuing firm, investors 
require higher initial day returns. OFFER_NAV*, on the other hand, is not significant, implying 
that there is no remaining information in the prevailing market premium that affects initial-day 
returns. This suggests that underwriters have incorporated useful information contained in the 
prevailing market premium in setting the offer price.  
After controlling for the popularity of IPOs during the pre-market period (POP_STK), we 
find that the coefficients for HOT_MKT and COLD_MKT are not statistically significant in 
explaining the initial-day return. 27  The coefficient for POP_STK is positive and highly 
                                                          
26 To derive consistent estimates, the instrument must fulfill two conditions: it must be uncorrelated with the 
error term, but is highly correlated with S_OWNERSHIP. In our case, the instrument variable is justified 
because its correlation with the error term is only 0.059 and statistically insignificant. The instrument variable 
also passed the standard diagnostic test for weak instruments; that is, the F-statistic of 11.646 is higher than the 
rule of thumb of 10. For ease of exposition, the result of the 1st stage regression is not shown in Table V. The 
significant variables in the 1st stage regression are S_REPUTATION, INSTITUTIONAL, IPO_SIZE, 
LIQUIDITY, and FIRM_SIZE. 
27 Recall that hot (cold) IPO markets are classified as periods at the top (bottom) quartile of IPO volume in the 
year of the offering. Insignificant results remain when the cut-off point for defining hot (cold) markets is 
increased to 30% of the IPO volume. 
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significant in both models. This is indicative of the effect of excess demand for shares spilling 
over to the secondary market; that is, investors who were not successful in the allocation exercise 
resorted to buying shares in the open market, and their actions increased the shares’ first-day 
closing price. It is likely that IPO stocks that attract a high level of interest from institutional and 
retail investors leads to underwriters exercising the overallotment option. The regression results 
are robust when we redefine popular IPO stocks as offerings with an overallotment. 28  In 
summary, Table V indicates that the market reception of individual IPO stocks has a significant 
influence on the initial-day return, while the prevailing market condition of the general IPO 
market does not.  
The regression results also indicate that the number of shares retained by the issuers 
(S_OWNERSHIP) plays a significant role in determining IPO underpricing. The positive 
coefficient indicates that issuers who sell proportionately fewer shares underprice the IPO to a 
greater degree. In addition, they stand to benefit from the initial price run-up on their retained 
shares (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). The coefficient for INSTITUTIONAL has the predicted 
positive sign and is statistically significant in Model 2. This suggests that a greater degree of 
underpricing is required to entice institutional investors to buy IPO stocks, which is consistent 
with the winners’ curse hypothesis that predicts a higher level of IPO underpricing in the 
presence of more institutional holdings. Meanwhile, the positive and significant coefficient for 
FIRST reflects the valuation uncertainty associated with the listing of pioneering REITs in the 
respective markets (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997).29  
                                                          
28 We also attempted to define POP_STK by the number of overallotment shares exercised divided by the total 
shares offered in the IPO. However, this identification strategy may cause an endogeneity problem, because 
the overallotment option is exercised post-IPO. 
29 To capture the potential effect of underpricing decreasing over time as investors become more familiar with 
the new product, we also substituted FIRST with the natural logarithm of the number of days since the first 
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While the underwriter’s reputation (U_REPUTATION) does not impact the newly listed 
firm’s initial performance, Model 2 shows that the issuer’s reputation (S_REPUTATION) has an 
inverse relationship with the degree of IPO underpricing. Market learning is positive and 
significantly related to underpricing, implying that investors required higher discounts for the 
IPOs done by sponsors that experienced more previous REIT IPOs. This discount seems to 
represent a compensation for potential agency costs faced by a newly listed REIT, because its 
future property acquisitions and competition for tenants could be subordinated to existing REITs 
managed by the same sponsor.30 Liquidity does not affect initial returns beyond the effects of 
other variables. 
In summary, we find that the initial-day return is positively related to the offer price 
premium to NAV and popularity of IPOs. Both the issuers and the investors gained from the 
IPO. Investors gained from the IPO underpricing, whereas issuers also gained from transferring 
the assets to a publicly listed entity at a premium to their intrinsic value.  
 
Determinants of Long-run Performance 
Table VI reports the estimation results for the long-run performance. As presented 
earlier, the long-run returns are represented by the individual REIT IPOs’ buy-and-hold returns 
(BAHRs) for the 100-day, one-year, and three-year periods after the first trading day. This value 
is measured as the raw BAHR of the IPO stock minus the contemporaneous BAHR of the 
respective general stock market index. The BAHRs are measured against the general stock 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
REIT in the market segment was listed (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). The results are qualitatively the same as for 
FIRST. 
30 This conflict of interest is evident especially among REITs in Asia that adopt the externally managed 
structure in which IPO sponsors continue providing assets and management services to their REITs after IPOs 
(Lecomte and Ooi, 2013; Downs et al., 2016). 
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market index (left panel) and the REIT market (right panel) in the respective countries. Since the 
main results do not change greatly, we base our following discussions on the left panel of Table 
VI. 
As expected, OFFER_NAV has a significant negative effect on the one-year (Model 2) 
and the three-year (Model 3) long-run performance. While the negative effect is also observed 
for these IPO stocks for the 100-day horizon (Model 1), the coefficient is not significant. This is 
mostly likely due to the lock-up period during which company insiders are not allowed to sell 
any of their shares.31  OFFER_NAV* (the offer price premium over peer-adjusted NAV), on the 
other hand, shows strongly significant positive effects on the long-run performance against 
general stocks for all horizons (Models 1-3). Note that OFFER_NAV* has an insignificant effect 
on the initial day return (Table V). The higher OFFER_NAV* seems to indicate that IPO REITs 
hold high-quality properties and or have better growth prospects compared to their peers. Thus, it 
is natural to observe better long-run performances with such IPO REITs.  
The regression coefficients of POP_STK, HOT_MKT, and COLD_MKT are statistically 
insignificant for the 100-day horizon (Model 1). HOT_MKT shows a positive significant effect in 
Model 2, and POP_STK shows a positive significant effect in Model 3. These results suggest that 
stock popularity, bullish market condition, and bearish market conditions during the offering do 
not have any effect on the short-run (100-day) underperformance of IPOs, while bullish market 
conditions and stock popularity affect the long-run performance over one-year or three-year 
horizons to some extent. 
The proportion of shares retained by issuers (S_OWNERSHIP) and the proportion of 
shares allocated to institutional investors (INSTITUTIONAL) have positive impacts on stock 
                                                          
31 The minimum lock-up period, typically 90 days, provides a commitment to the market that insiders will not 
immediately cash out their shareholdings following the IPO (see Chen, Chen and Huang, 2012). 
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underperformance that is observed during the first 100 days. Interestingly, the result shows that 
the stock performance of IPO REITs is negatively associated with the reputation of sponsors 
(S_REPUTATION) for one-year and three-year horizons (Models 2 and 3).  
 
Conclusions 
The paper examines issuers’ rationale behind the IPO underpricing. We use a sample of 
REIT IPOs listed in four Asian markets (Malaysia, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) from 
2001 to 2013, which offers a good indication of the listing firms’ fundamental values. Several 
interesting observations are made. While the IPO underpricing is evident (3.1%) with REIT 
IPOs, we find that issuers on average priced new issues 3.5% higher than their fundamental 
values measured by firms’ NAVs. Thus, an IPO could be underpriced and yet produce a net gain 
for the issuer from IPO, which is why issuers can rationalize setting the offer price low relative 
to the first-day closing price. We also find that underwriters are generally careful enough to 
avoid missing an opportunity and incorporate the information contained in the market premium 
of the existing publicly traded REITs in setting IPO pricing. Several significant implications can 
be drawn from this study.  
First, real estate owners can and do take advantage of “windows of opportunity” to divest 
asset holdings through the IPO route (instead of selling them directly in the private property 
market). Specifically, these owners favor the IPO route when more value can be extracted 
through the public market. This finding supports the IPO market-timing hypothesis (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002; Lowry, 2003).32 Our results also offer an explanation to yet another puzzle in the 
                                                          
32 Previous studies by Lerner (1994) and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) also show that the industry’s 
high market-to-book ratios have a substantial effect on the firm’s decision to go public.  
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IPO literature highlighted by Ritter and Welch (2002), which is why the volume declines 
precipitously following a stock market decline. In a cold IPO market, there is a quantity 
adjustment (that is, the number of IPOs declines) rather than a price adjustment, because the 
issuer has to sell shares below the NAV. Issuers who are averse to registering any net loss have 
the options of either selling their assets in the private market or deferring the offering to another 
time.  
Second, our investigation shows that the IPO underpricing is mostly a product of 
frothiness attributable to excess demand in the IPO market. Although the issuers could have 
exploited the situation by fully skimming the froth, the evidence suggests that they do not. 
Because the offer price is already higher than the intrinsic value of the assets (that is, what the 
assets could have fetched if they had been sold in the private property market), issuers price the 
shares slightly lower than their peers. Our main finding that IPOs can be underpriced but 
represent a net gain for the issuing firm calls for alternative methods of measuring the 
fundamental value for non-REIT new firms. Given that issuers of non-REIT firms do leave 
money on the table, it is plausible to expect that the IPOs of general stocks may also be priced 
higher than their fundamental values, if measured correctly.  
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Figure I: Distribution of IPO pricing 
This figure summarizes the distribution of the average IPO pricing based on sample means. Panel A 
shows the total gain from the average IPO, which is measured as the difference between first-day closing 
price and NAV per share. The portion of the gain between B and A represents the net gain for the firm 
from IPO, while the portion of the gain between C and B represents IPO underpricing. Panel B shows the 
issuer’s IPO filing range; the floor price and the ceiling price, relative to the firm NAV. NAV* represents 
the expected price level based on the prevailing peer-NAV premiums at the time of issue and is defined as 
the NAV of IPO REIT multiplied by (one plus peer-NAV premium) in which the peer-NAV premium is 
the median NAV premium among peers (all REITs within the same country) at the time of the IPO. 
 
Panel A: 
 
 
   
 
 
Panel B: 
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Figure II: Price/NAV premium of REITs (Jan 2012-Dec 2014) 
Chart A tracks the monthly NAV premium (closing price/NAV per share) and the volume of Asian REIT 
IPOs between 2002 and 2014. The vertical axis on the left-hand side represents the total number of IPOs 
in the corresponding month, whereas the vertical axis on the right-hand side represents the median NAV 
premium. Chart B tracks the yearly NAV premium and the volume of all Asian IPOs (not just REITs) 
between 2002 and 2014 in each of the four Asian stock markets. The vertical axis on the left-hand side 
(bar chart) represents the total number of IPOs in the corresponding year (by country) whereas the vertical 
axis on the right-hand side represents the median NAV premium. 
 
Chart A: REIT IPO volume and price/NAV premium 
 
 
Chart B: Asian IPO volume and price/NAV premium 
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Table I: Sample Distribution of REIT IPOs 
This table presents the sample distribution of 112 REIT IPOs from 2001 to 2013. The sample includes 
four spin-offs that were eventually excluded from the final sample because their shares were distributed to 
the existing shareholders of the issuers. The average proceeds, in $ million, and the total number of IPOs 
(reported in brackets) for each market and in each year are reported.   
 
Year Japan Singapore Hong Kong Malaysia All  
2001 $561.8m [2] - - - $561.8m [2] 
2002 $281.9m [4] $145.6m [2] - - $236.4m [6] 
2003 $434.7m [4] $151.0m [1] - - $378.0m [5] 
2004 $395.0m [5] $462.1m [2] - - $414.2m [7] 
2005 $285.5m [13] $256.3m [2] $1126.0m [3] $62.1m [3] $370.9m [21] 
2006 $480.7m [12] $156.1m [8] $580.6m [2] $68.4m [4] $339.6m [26] 
2007 $292.9m [2] $275.0m [5] $301.5m [2] $39.3m [4] $209.3m [13] 
2008 $0 [0] $191.3m [1]   $0 [0] $0 [0] $191.3m [1] 
2009 $0 [0] $0 [0] $0 [0] $0 [0] $0 [0] 
2010 $0 [0] $513.2m [3] $0 [0] $360.1m [2] $452.0 [5] 
2011 $0 [0] $692.7m [2] $1856.7m [1] $221.9m [1] $866.0 [4] 
2012 $835.2m [4] $470.5m [3] $0 [0] $274.1m [1] $628.3 [8] 
2013 $765.5m [6] $599.5m [5] $283.9m [3] $0 [0] $603.0 [14] 
2001-2013 $460.9m [52] $353.8 [34] $713.7m [11] $122.2m [15] $407.8 [112] 
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Table II: IPO Pricing 
This table reports the summary statistics for the IPO pricing of 107 REITs listed between 2001 and 2013. 
The floor (ceiling) is the minimum (maximum) filing price range determined during the book building 
process, respectively. Fees are underwriting spread (% of IPO proceeds) incurred by individual IPOs. 
NAV* is defined as the NAV of IPO REIT (multiplied by one plus peer-NAV premium), where peer-
NAV premium is the median NAV premium among peers (all REITs within the same country) at the time 
of the IPO. 
 
 
Panel A:  
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1.0%, 5.0% and 10.0% levels, respectively.  
Panel B:  
 % of sample 
 ≥ midpoint ≥ceiling price ≥NAV ≥NAV* 
Floor price 0% 0% 35.51% 25.49% 
Offer price 69.89% 0% 75.70% 41.18% 
Ceiling price 100% 100% 73.80% 36.27% 
1st day close 61.29% 55.14% 69.16% 46.08% 
 
 
 
  
 Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
1st day close/offer price -1 3.08%*** 0.57%* 12.13% -16.01% 59.29% 107 
1st day close/ceiling price -1 0.73% -1.04% 14.12% -25.27% 59.29% 93 
1st day close/NAV -1 7.10%*** 3.93%*** 19.44% -46.58% 83.67% 107 
Ceiling price/NAV -1 6.56%*** 4.12%*** 11.85% -32.72% 66.94% 93 
(Offer price)(1-fees)/NAV -1 0.27% 0% 11.17% -38.30% 61.10% 107 
Offer price/NAV -1 3.54%*** 3.63%*** 11.53% -36.39% 66.94% 107 
Midpoint/NAV -1 2.85%** 1.78%*** 11.41% -34.56% 62.20% 93 
Floor price/NAV -1 -0.87% -0.48%** 11.55% -36.39% 57.45% 93 
1st day close/NAV* -1 1.59% -1.88% 23.67% -33.31% 91.35% 102 
Celling price/NAV* -1 1.23% -4.00% 26.08% -29.0% 128.32% 89 
Offer price/NAV* -1 -0.96% -4.00% 21.17% -29.0% 90.26% 102 
Midpoint/NAV* -1 -2.40% -7.62%** 24.31% -31.01% 109.29% 89 
Floor price/NAV* -1 -6.02%** -12.38%*** 22.84% -33.59% 90.26% 89 
35 
Table III: Effects of Market Condition and Market Reception on IPO Pricing 
 
This table presents the mean values for the IPO for a sample of REITs listed in Asia between 2001 and 
2013. In columns [1] to [3], the IPOs are partitioned into hot issue, normal issue, and cold issue markets 
on the basis of the total volume of IPO issues in the respective markets from 2000 to 2013. Periods at the 
top quartile of the IPO volume are classified as hot issue markets, and those at the bottom 25% are 
classified as cold issue markets. In columns [4] and [5], IPOs are partitioned into popular and non-popular 
IPO stocks on the basis of the market’s reception to the individual offerings. Whenever the final offer 
price is higher than the midpoint of the book-building price range, the IPO is classified as a popular stock.  
 
 [1] 
Hot 
[2] 
Normal 
[3] 
Cold 
[4] 
Popular 
IPOs 
[5] 
Unpopular 
IPOs 
IPO Pricing      
1st day close/offer price - 1   4.68%  3.18% -1.33%   6.89% -4.09% 
1st day close/ceiling price - 1 -0.11%  1.46% -4.13%   6.57% -10.42% 
1st day close/NAV - 1 10.44%  7.0%   1.06% 14.63% -5.87% 
Ceiling price/NAV - 1   7.94%  6.44%   5.06%  7.43%   4.90% 
(Offer price)(1-fees)/NAV - 1   1.41%  0.17% -3.50%  3.39% -5.13% 
Offer price/NAV -1   4.84%  3.44%   1.76%  7.08%  -2.16% 
Midpoint/NAV  -1 3.61% 2.89% 0.99% 3.99% 0.67% 
Floor price/NAV -1 -0.71% -0.65% -3.08%  0.54% -3.57% 
1st day close/NAV* -1   2.39%  1.12%   5.17%  -0.50%   3.38% 
Celling price/NAV* -1   4.63% -0.48% 10.39% -6.95% 15.81% 
Offer price/NAV* -1 -0.05%  -1.80%   6.54% -7.30%   7.54% 
Midpoint/NAV* -1 0.03% -3.82% 6.05% -9.88% 10.93% 
Floor price/NAV* -1 -4.57% -7.16% 1.72% -1.28% 6.06% 
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Table IV: Definition and Descriptive Statistics  
This table reports the summary statistics for variables used in regression models from 2001 to 2013.  
Variables Definition Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Dependent Variables       
First Day Returns  IPO closing price minus offer price 
divided by offer price. 
3.08% 0.57% 12.13% –16.01%  59.29% 107 
100-Day BAHR 100-day buy-and-hold general stock 
market adjusted return. 
–1.31% –2.00% 15.26% –48.0% 58.0% 107 
One-Year BAHR One-year buy-and-hold general stock 
market adjusted return. 
–0.35% 0.00% 29.63% –60.0% 134.0% 107 
Three-Year BAHR Three-year buy-and hold general stock 
market adjusted return. 
2.22% –4.00% 42.53% –86.0% 158.0% 105 
        
Explanatory Variables        
OFFER _NAV Offer price divided by the NAV per 
share minus 1. 
3.54% 3.63% 11.53% –36.39% 66.94% 107 
OFFER_NAV* Offer price divided by the NAV* per 
share minus 1. NAV* = NAV (1+ peer-
NAV premium) 
-0.96% -4.00% 21.17% -29.00% 90.26% 102 
POP_STK Percentage difference between the final 
offer price and the midpoint of the filling 
range.  
1.01% 1.75% 3.51% –11.55% 9.40% 93 
HOT_MKT  Binary variable equal to 1 if the IPO is 
issued during the top quartile of IPO 
volume in the respective markets. 
0.159 0 0.367 0 1 107 
COLD_MKT Binary variable equal to 1 if the IPO is 
issued during the bottom quartile of IPO 
volume in the respective markets. 
0.075 0 0.264 0 1 107 
S_OWNERSHIP Percentage of REIT stocks retained by 
sponsors. 
22.66% 15.80% 19.04% 0% 70.9% 107 
S_REPUTATION  Binary variable equal to 1 if the issuer is 
a publicly listed company. 
0.692 1 0.464 0 1 107 
U_REPUTATION The ratio of lead underwriters’ IPO 
proceeds to total IPO proceeds raised by 
4.17% 3.70% 3.00% 0.05% 17.2% 107 
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all underwriters in the Asia Pacific. 
INSTITUTIONAL  Percentage of a REIT’s shares held by 
institutional investors. 
43.32% 42.35% 17.98% 3.86% 92.1% 107 
IPO_SIZE   Offer price multiplied by number of 
shares offered (US$). 
412.34 293.82 415.17 21.82 2,839.24 107 
FIRST   Binary variable equal to 1 if the IPO is 
the first by property type in the 
respective REIT markets. 
0.187 0 0.392 0 1 107 
MARKET 
LEARNING 
Numerical variable that captures the 
sequence of the IPOs done by each 
sponsor, i.e., 1 for the very first IPO 
done by a sponsor, 2 for second IPO, and 
so on.  
1.34 1 0.92 1 6 107 
LIQUIDITY  Difference between asking price and 
bidding price scaled by the midpoint of 
the bid-ask prices on the IPO date. 
0.005 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.016 107 
 
Note: S_OWNERSHIP and IPO_SIZE are transformed to their natural logs in the regression models. 
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Table V: Determinants of Initial Day Return 
This table reports estimates of the OLS (Model 1) and 2SLS (Model 2) regressions to examine the 
determinants of the IPOs’ initial-day return. The right-hand side variables are defined in Table IV. The 
instrument variable for the 2SLS is firm size, which is measured by the natural log of the REIT’s market 
capitalization. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses with robust standard errors. ***, **, and * refer 
to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (2SLS)  
 Initial Day Return Initial Day Return 
INTERCEPT  -0.031 -0.101 
 (-0.36) (-0.87) 
OFFER_NAV 0.278* 0.256** 
 (1.82) (2.07) 
OFFER_NAV* -0.074 -0.032 
 (-1.26) (-0.39) 
POP_STK  1.364*** 1.455*** 
 (3.01) (3.41) 
HOT_MKT 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.05) (-0.17) 
COLD_MKT -0.042 -0.011 
 (-1.64) (-0.23) 
S_OWNERSHIP 0.600** 2.517*** 
 (2.28) (3.06) 
S_REPUTATION -0.020 -0.055* 
 (-0.96) (-1.81) 
U_REPUTATION -0.777 -0.637 
 (-1.64) (-1.26) 
INSTITUTIONAL 0.104 0.345*** 
 (1.59) (2.80) 
IPO_SIZE -0.039 -0.082* 
 (-1.02) (-1.86) 
FIRST 0.085*** 0.103*** 
 (3.49) (2.85) 
MARKET LEARNING 0.056*** 0.043*** 
 (3.29) (2.78) 
LIQUIDITY  -0.983 9.527 
 (-0.27) (1.36) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes 
Property-type fixed effects Yes Yes 
# of observations 88 88 
R2 0.61 0.32 
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Table VI: Determinants of IPO Long-run Performance 
This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions to examine the determinants of IPO’s long-run stock performance. In Models 1-3 (4-6), the 
IPO long-run performances are measured against the general stock (REIT) market index in each country. The dependent variables are the general 
stock (REIT) market-adjusted 100-day buy-and-hold total return (BAHR), one-year BAHR, and three-year BAHR. The right-hand side variables 
are defined in Table IV. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses with robust standard errors. ***, **, and * refer to statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 General Stock MarketCounty i,t   REIT MarketCounty i,t 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 100-day BAHR One-year BAHR Three-year BAHR  100-day BAHR One-year BAHR Three-year BAHR 
INTERCEPT  -0.032 0.014 0.093  -0.059 -0.282* -0.781** 
 (-0.21) (0.06) (0.25)  (-0.45) (-1.95) (-2.40) 
OFFER_NAV -0.219 -0.808*** -1.691***  0.049 -0.251 -0.762*** 
 (-1.37) (-2.85) (-4.93)  (0.45) (-1.38) (-2.99) 
OFFER_NAV* 0.272*** 0.545** 1.114***  0.137 0.166 0.449** 
 (2.90) (2.20) (4.12)  (0.22) (1.00) (2.50) 
POP_STK  0.181 0.547 3.217**  -0.289 0.490 2.398** 
 (0.28) (0.50) (2.04)  (-0.54) (0.68) (2.00) 
HOT_MKT 0.033 0.116* 0.095  0.034 0.054 0.013 
 (0.85) (1.72) (1.19)  (0.99) (1.23) (0.16) 
COLD_MKT 0.020 -0.050 0.176  -0.039 -0.012 0.118 
 (0.38) (-0.49) (0.86)  (-1.07) (-0.15) (0.97) 
S_OWNERSHIP 1.021** 1.070* 2.092**  0.700** 1.009** 1.493* 
 (2.20) (1.84) (2.03)  (2.05) (2.44) (1.87) 
S_REPUTATION -0.032 -0.139* -0.194*  -0.031 -0.086* -0.142* 
 (-1.06) (-1.96) (-1.94)  (-1.11) (-1.87) (-1.77) 
U_REPUTATION 1.096** -1.116 -0.271  0.627 -0.807 -1.006 
 (2.07) (-0.68) (-0.15)  (1.51) (-0.72) (-0.66) 
INSTITUTIONAL 0.270** 0.314* 0.416  0.223** 0.410*** 0.463** 
 (2.38) (1.80) (1.59)  (2.41) (3.53) (2.08) 
IPO_SIZE -0.061 0.032 -0.022  -0.042 0.051 0.194 
 (-0.93) (0.41) (-0.16)  (-0.73) (1.05) (1.62) 
FIRST 0.024 0.075 0.175  -0.031 0.083 0.111 
 (0.53) (0.54) (1.37)  (-0.71) (0.86) (1.08) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Property-type fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
# of observations 88 88 86  88 88 86 
R2 0.39 0.39 0.35  0.35 0.29 0.33 
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Table AI. Structure of Asian REITs 
 Japan Singapore Malaysia  Hong Kong 
Year of first IPO 2001 2002 2005 2005 
Mgmt. structure External  External External External* 
Asset structure  >75% in real estate >70% in real estate >50% in real estate 100% in real estate 
Foreign properties  No restrictions No restrictions No restrictions No restrictions 
Leverage No restrictions 35% of total assets 
60% for rated REITs  
50% of total assets 45% of asset value 
Payout >90% of taxable 
income 
>90% of taxable 
income 
>90% of taxable 
income 
90% of after tax 
income 
Tax benefit Tax exempt on 
income distributed 
Tax exempt on 
rental income 
distributed 
Tax exempt on 
distribution 
Tax exempt 
* All are externally managed with the exception of the Link REIT. 
Source: Chan, Chen and Wang (2013)  
 
